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South Asian Geopolitics: Saudi Arabia: 1 Iran: 0?
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It may be reading tea leaves but analysis of the walk-up to Saudi crown prince Mohammed
bin Salman’s visit and his sojourn in Islamabad suggests that Pakistan may be about to fight
battles on two fronts rather than just the Indian one in the wake of this month’s attacks in
Kashmir.
Prince Mohammed’s expressions of unconditional support for Pakistan coupled with his
promise of US$ 20 billion in investments in addition to US$ 6 billion in desperately
needed financial aid raise the specter of a shift in Pakistani efforts in recent years to walk a
fine line in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
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That fine line included a 2015 Pakistani refusal to send troops to the kingdom  in support
of the Saudi military intervention in Yemen.
Speaking to the Arab News this week, Major General Asif Ghafoor, head of the Pakistan
army’s media wing, suggested that Pakistan’s commitment to Saudi Arabia was equally
unconditional. “Pakistan is committed to standing by its Saudi brethren,”  Maj. Gen. Ghafoor
said.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi seemed to fine tune the officer’s
statement by not mentioning Yemen in his remarks to the Saudi paper and limiting
Pakistan’s commitment to the kingdom itself. “If anyone would create chaos in or attack the
Kingdom, Pakistan would stand by its brethren Saudi Arabia,” Mr. Qureishi said.
The stakes for Pakistan that borders on Iran and is home to the world’s largest minority
Shiite Muslim community could not be higher.
Concerned that Pakistan’s position may be shifting, Iran this week dialed up the rhetoric by
warning that Pakistan would "pay a high price" for last week’s attack in the Iranian
province of Sistan and Baluchistan that killed 27 Revolutionary Guards.
Like with India in the case of Kashmir, Iran asserted that the perpetrators, Jaish-al-Adl, were
operating from Pakistani territory with at least the tacit knowledge of Pakistani authorities.
In an unusual disclosure, Iran said three of the six perpetrators of last week’s attack,
including the suicide bomber, were Pakistani nationals.
In the past, Iran has by and large said that militants who had launched attacks were Iranian
nationals rather than Pakistanis.
The tone of Revolutionary Guards chief Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari’s statement
holding Pakistan, alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, responsible for the
recent attack reflected Iranian concern with what may flow from Prince Mohammed’s visit.
“Why do Pakistan’s army and security body ... give refuge to these anti-revolutionary
groups? Pakistan will no doubt pay a high price. Just in the past year, six or seven suicide attacks
were neutralized but they were able to carry out this one,”,” Maj. Gen. Jafari said in remarks live
on state television.
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Initially, Iran had limited itself to blaming external powers rather than Pakistan for the attack.
Indications suggesting that Prince Mohammed’s visit to Pakistan may have been about more
than economic cooperation were severalfold and involved gestures that despite Pakistani
denials would not have come without a price tag.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan expressed in a little-noticed declaration in their joint statement at
the end of the crown prince’s visit “the need to avoid politicization of the United Nations
listing system.”
The statement was implicitly referring to Indian efforts to get the UN Security Council to
designate Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. Mr. Azhar is the head of Jaish-e-Mohammed,
the group that has claimed responsibility for the Kashmir attack.
China, which at Pakistan’s behest has blocked Mr. Azhar’s designation in recent years, this
week rejected an Indian request that it lift its veto. China asserts that Indian evidence fails to
meet UN standards.
The reference to UN listing in the Saudi-Pakistani statement seemingly failed to resonate in
New Delhi where Prince Mohammed stopped after visiting Islamabad.
In another tantalizing incident, Mr. Qureshi, the Pakistani foreign minister, did nothing to
distance his country from a statement in his presence by Saudi State Minister for Foreign
Affairs Adel Al-Jubeir accusing Iran of being the "world’s chief sponsor of terrorism"
Similarly, in preparation of Prince Mohammed’s talks, retired General Raheel Sharif, the
Pakistani commander of the Saudi-based, 40-nation Islamic Military Counter Terrorism
Coalition (IMCTC), flew from Riyadh to Islamabad for talks with prime minister Imran Khan
and Pakistani chief of staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa.
Pakistan agreed to General Sharif’s appointment as commander despite its refusal to join the
coalition in the belief that the 2017 Saudi request that he is seconded put the South Asian
nation between a rock and hard place.
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Pakistani military officials argued at the time that while the appointment would irritate Iran,
refusal of the Saudi request would expose Pakistan to criticism from many more in the
Islamic world.
Neither the Pakistani government nor the IMCTC gave details of General Sharif’s discussions.
The IMCTC, however, said in a tweet that “salient contours of IMCTC's domains and
initiatives in the fight against #terrorism were discussed.”
The tone and gestures during Prince Mohammed’s visit contrasted starkly with positions
adopted by Mr. Khan during his election campaign and immediately after he took office last
year.
In his first post-election televised speech Mr. Khan made a point of discussing his
country’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
“We want to improve ties with Iran. Saudi Arabia is a friend who has always stood by us in difficult
times. Our aim will be that whatever we can do for conciliation in the Middle East, we want to play
that role. Those tensions, that fight, between neighbors, we will try to bring them together," Mr.
Khan said.
The geopolitical fallout, if any, of what for now amounts to symbolism will likely only be
evident in the weeks and months to come.
Beyond Iran’s toughening stance towards Pakistan in the wake of the attack on its
Revolutionary Guards, tell-tale signs would be a closer Pakistani alignment with the Saud-led
anti-terrorism coalition and the degree to which Pakistan-based militant launch attacks
inside Iran.
Middle East scholar Michael Stephens, who heads the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
operation in Qatar suggested that reading the tea leaves may best be done with a grain of
salt.
“Geography is what it is, and Pakistan will always have to maintain a relationship with Iran
(economic and security) regardless of how much cash it gets from Riyadh… Pakistan will do
what's best for Pakistan, and not Riyadh, the US or Tehran. Telling everyone what they want to
hear is kinda how this all works,” Mr. Stephens said.
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A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, and .
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